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ABSTRACT
Do the most promising policies to promote sustainable upland farm-
ing originate at the local or national level? Will coordination of local
and national efforts produce better outcomes? In this paper, we used
an optimization-simulation model of the Manupali watershed in the
Philippines to investigate these issues. We compared the economic
and environmental effects of four sets of stylized policy changes: (1)
local policies that restrict some forms of land use; (2) local attempts
to subsidize environment-friendly technologies; (3) a crop-specific
tax levied on vegetable production; and (4) a hybrid approach that
seeks to coordinate local technology initiatives with a broader-based
national pricing policy.
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INTRODUCTION
The protection and management of watersheds is both a lo-
cal and national policy imperative throughout the developing
world, especially in densely populated regions of South and South-
east Asia (Doolette and Magrath 1990; APO 1995). High rates of
hillside erosion and downstream sedimentation are among the mostPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 102
important agricultural externalities in the developing world
(Anderson and Thampapillai 1990; World Bank 1992). Suspended
solids and transported nutrients and agricultural chemicals reduce
the quality of drinking water (Munasinghe 1992). Siltation of
streams increases the risks of flash floods (UNESCO 1982). Accu-
mulation of silt reduces the productivity of aquatic ecosystems
(OECD 1993) and accumulation of sediment in reservoirs reduces
hydroelectric capacity and equipment life (Naiman 1995).  Of ad-
ditional concern is that erosion from upland farming creates sedi-
ment in downstream irrigation systems, reducing both their pro-
ductivity and expected life (e.g., Cruz et al. 1988; DuBois 1990).
This is especially important in light of evidence that a lack of reli-
able water supply precludes expansion and intensification of agri-
culture in many low-income areas of Asia (Myers 1988; Svendson
and Rosegrant 1994). Estimates from the Philippines suggest 74-
81 million tons of soil is lost annually, and 63-77 percent of the
country’s total land area is affected by erosion (FMB 1998).  Sedi-
mentation has reduced the storage capacity of almost all of the
Philippines’ major reservoirs, and has measurably affected domestic
water consumption, power generation, and irrigation. Over the
last 25 years, the dry season irrigated area has fallen by 20-30 per-
cent in several of the country’s key irrigation systems (FMB 1998).
Although the biophysical links between upland farms and down-
stream water users are well documented (e.g., Dixon and Easter
1986), policies to promote sustainable upland farming remain elu-
sive.
In most tropical watersheds, rates of land degradation de-
pend upon the decisions made by upland farmers.  These deci-
sions, in turn, are influenced by the interplay of wages, prices, and
economic opportunities in the general economy (Coxhead 1997;
Shively 1998; Coxhead et al. 2002). To varying degrees circumscribed
by resource constraints, personal goals, and societal norms, farm-
ers respond in predictable ways to policy changes instituted at the
local and national levels. But the ongoing process of economic de-
centralization and political devolution places pressure on local andSHIVELY & ZELEK : Policy & Environment Link      103
national policymakers to define and articulate their spheres of in-
fluence and responsibility. This evolution in policymaking raises
questions about the appropriate point of entry for policymakers.
In this paper, we use results from a simulation model of
economy-environment linkages to study and compare some styl-
ized policy options available to local and national policymakers for
whom watershed protection is a goal. Our empirical focus is the
Manupali watershed in the Philippines. Our results are based on a
modeling strategy that captures, in a very basic way, the interrela-
tionships of biological and economic phenomena.  We investigate
both the budgetary and human welfare implications of changes in
land use induced by a range of policy instruments.
Our approach constitutes a somewhat unique methodologi-
cal contribution to the field of watershed modeling.  The standard
approach to watershed modeling focuses on detailed development
of hydrological and biophysical details, often at the expense of the
characterization of the behavior of economic agents in the model.
In contrast, we present in this paper a model that takes as its unit of
analysis the farm household, and presents agents in a way that is
consistent with economic theory. We assume optimizing behavior
on the part of farmers and rational behavioral responses to policy
changes. We model environmental externalities as outcomes of op-
timizing behavior and provide indicators of the economic and envi-
ronmental outcomes associated with patterns of land use and policy
changes.
FRAMEWORK, DATA AND STUDY SITE
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the model
used in the analysis.  Additional details regarding the model
can be found in Shively (2001).1 In the Appendix, we present
the mathematical structure of the model, which relates economic
incentives to decisions and outcomes on representative farms.
1 See http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/staff/shively/manupali. Shively and Coxhead (forth-
coming) also report results based on the model.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 104
Figure 1 is a flow chart that illustrates the process of model
construction and the utilization of empirical data for calibra-
tion and parameterization of the model.  As Figure 1 indicates,
the model makes use of two main sources of information.  So-
cioeconomic data, including panel data described in Coxhead
et al. (2002), are used to define resources and resource con-
straints, and to develop stylized household models of behav-
ioral response.  In addition, land use data are used to calibrate
and develop baseline projections of land use and economic and
environmental outcomes.  Land use data from the watershed
are also used to develop weights and scaling parameters that
allow us to aggregate outcomes from representative households
farms and zones up to landscape-scale effects.  In developing
predictions of erosion outcomes and aggregate impacts, we rely
on insights provided by several sources of agronomic and test
plot data, including data from the watershed provided by Poudel
et al. (2000).
In setting up the model, we focus on four representative
households occupying four representative agroeconomic zones in
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2 Bin (1994) identifies six agroecological zones in the watershed and divides the agricultural
environment into three distinct groups.  Two of these are upland agricultural areas and one
is a lowland paddy rice zone concentrated in lower elevations on slopes less than 2°. The
latter zone is not incorporated into this analysis. We further decompose the upland zone into
the four zones studied here.
the Manupali watershed.2  The Manupali watershed is located in
northern central Mindanao, in the Philippine province of Bukidnon.
It extends from Mt. Kitanglad in the northwest to the Pulangi River
in the southeast.  Average elevation is 600 meters above sea level
and average rainfall is 2,300 millimeters. The watershed covers an
area of approximately 60,000 hectares, more than 40 percent of
which is classified as hilly or mountainous (Coxhead and
Buenavista 2001). The watershed may be classified into four geo-
morphic units: mountains, upper footslopes, lower footslopes, and
alluvial terraces.  The population of the watershed in 1994 was
39,500, and historically the population has grown at a rate of 4
percent annually.  In 1988, 71 percent of employment was in agri-
culture, 5 percent was in industry, and 23 percent was in services.
Major crops grown are corn, sugarcane, and rice in the lower el-
evations, and corn, coffee, and a range of vegetables in the upper
elevations. Soils in the area are clay and clay loams that are slightly
to strongly acidic. Bin (1994) describes the physical characteristics
of the watershed in detail.
Table 1 briefly describes cropping patterns for each type of
household in the four zones of interest.  The data are based on de-
tailed farm survey data reported by Coxhead (1995), Coxhead and
Rola (1998), and Rola et al. (1999). Each representative household is
defined in terms of a four-crop portfolio. The table lists primary crops
for each household. This typology is a simplification, since in real-
ity many households have the option of choosing from a much wider
set of crops. Similarly, few households are strictly limited to a four-
crop portfolio.  Nevertheless, the data reflect the essential patterns
of production in the upper portion of the Manupali watershed and
capture a significant degree of the variation in land use and out-
comes. Most farms grow a combination of food and cash crops;PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 106
few specialize. However, planting patterns suggest some farmers
have better access than others to information and resources such
as credit, inputs, hired labor, or improved planting materials.
The most widely grown crop in the upper Manupali water-
shed is white corn. Nearly all households in the upper reaches of
the watershed grow white corn. In 1997, white corn occupied ap-
proximately 48 percent of all cultivated area in the upper water-
shed.  Although a market for white corn exists in the area, house-
holds typically grow it for home processing, storage, and consump-
tion. Following white corn in importance (in terms of occupied area)
are coffee (30%), yellow corn (12%), and vegetables (10%). Although
vegetables occupy a small share of land area, cabbage, potato, and
tomato production have grown in popularity in recent years.3  How-
ever, due to highly erosive and pesticide-intensive production prac-
tices, the growing number of vegetable producers in the area has
become a policy concern. Table 2 contains the average slopes for
each zone and erosion rate estimates (by slope) for major crops grown
in the zones.  These estimates provide parameters for farm-level ero-
sion predictions in the model.
Our model is designed to simulate optimizing activity in up-
land agriculture and on-farm and off-farm consequences. The logic
Table 1. Cropping patterns for representative farms
25% 25% 25% 25% Coffee
25% 25% 25% 25% Vegetables
25% 25% 25% 25% Yellow corn








(forest-buffer) - - - -
Source: Compiled by the authors based from data reported in Rola et al. (1999).
3 Cabbage is locally important in terms of value. In terms of its production and market char-
acteristics, cabbage is representative of a range of vegetable crops grown in the area, includ-
ing potato and tomato.SHIVELY & ZELEK : Policy & Environment Link      107




Average erosion rate (t/ha/yr)
10.7 34.5 Average slope
Zones 2 & 3 Zones 1& 2
of the model is guided by choices regarding land shares for avail-
able crops. These choices are influenced by relative prices (and by
policies such as taxes or subsidies on crops), the relative risks of
the crops (measured by a variance-covariance matrix for prices),
yields, input costs, access to credit, risk aversion, and land quality
over time.  Table 3 provides the input requirements and yields of a
one-hectare plot of each type of crop.  It is important to note that
cabbage provides three crops per year, white and yellow corns
provide two crops each, and coffee provides one crop.   Table 4
lists essential data used to characterize farms in this study, includ-
ing output and input prices and resource endowments.  For our
purposes, we identify the lowland sector by a receptor site. Here
sediment accumulates and the flows of nutrients and agricultural
chemicals are monitored. Motivation for studying these externali-
ties comes from a study of lowland farms indicating a range of
negative impacts, among them siltation in irrigation systems for
rice farms (Singh et al., undated). In the model, the flow of erosion
from upland farms determines the rate of sediment accumulation
(and nutrient and pesticide transport) at the receptor site. Holding
constant slope and soil characteristics, erosion rates depend on
crop shares and area planted.
The policy dimension of the model consists of crop-specific
taxes and subsidies, crop- and technology-specific incentives, and
Sources:  Slopes calculated using data reported in Bin (1994), Table 5.2;  Erosion
rates adapted from David (1984), Table 5, using data reported in Cruz et al. (1988)
and Poudel et al. (2000).PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 108
Table 3. Input requirements and yields per cropping of one-hectare plots in WSM
6541 3 211 150 Cabbage
527 0 50 150 Coffee
1500 0 136 100 Yellow corn










policies to alter price variability in all or specific crops. Values for
these parameters characterize the economic environment in which
representative farmers make decisions. Outcomes of interest de-
termined in the model include crop shares, levels of input use, and
levels of household income, erosion rates, downstream effects, and
public sector budgets. Initial values for model parameters and stocks,
as well as yield production functions and erosion rates, were de-
rived, where possible, from data collected in the Manupali water-
shed.
Figure 2 illustrates the model as a system, in which variables
are related via flows and feedbacks.  Households are endowed with
Table 4. Watershed model exogenous parameters
1.00 Farmsize (hectares per household)
400 Labor endowment (laborday per household)
7.00 Fertilizer cost (pesos per kg)
421.50 Pesticide cost (pesos per liter)
65.00 Labor cost (pesos per laborday)
8.00 Cabbage price (pesos per kg)
39.00 Coffee price (pesos per kg)
5.66 Yellow corn price (pesos per kg)
6.50 White corn price (pesos per kg)
3000 Initial soil stock (mm of depth)
Parameter ValueSHIVELY & ZELEK : Policy & Environment Link      109
Figure 2.  System variable relationships
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initial levels of land, soil quality, labor, and capital.  Representative
farms make choices regarding the allocation of land and other inputs
to specific crops.  Cropping decisions result in income realization,
along with on-farm rates of erosion.  Soil losses are associated with
nitrogen and pesticide loss.  These result in off-site pollution and sedi-
mentation at the receptor site downstream.  In addition, erosion re-
sults in depletion of farm soil stock, which reduces productivity in
future periods.  By altering relative incentives for specific crops, gov-
ernment policies such as taxes and subsidies on crops and inputs, as
well as policies that influence income variability, could alter crop choice
and influence environmental outcomes.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 110
SIMULATION RESULTS
We conducted a series of four policy experiments with the
model. In selecting these experiments, our aim is to investigate natu-
ral resource management policy scenarios that extend across a spec-
trum ranging from those emphasizing local focus and control to
those that are more broadly based. These are: (1) a locally man-
dated land-use restriction that prohibits vegetable growing; (2) a
locally mandated requirement that farms install and maintain ap-
propriate soil conservation structures, combined with a lump-sum
subsidy payment for doing so; (3) a nationally implemented 20
percent tax on the producer price of vegetables; and (4) a national/
local cost-sharing policy in which revenues from a 20 percent tax
on the producer price of vegetables are used to subsidize the local
installation and maintenance of appropriate soil conservation struc-
tures.  In all cases, we conduct our policy experiments over 10-
year time horizons and assume the policy changes are sustained
for the full length of the simulation. To facilitate comparison, we
convert cash flows to net present values (NPV), using a discount
rate of 5 percent. We express outcomes as indexes relative to out-
comes derived in the base run of the model. Results from these
simulations are presented in Table 5.
A Ban on Vegetable Production
Given the importance of vegetable production within the wa-
tershed (both in terms of income generation and environmental
outcomes), we begin our analysis with an investigation of the po-
tential economic and environmental impacts of restricting vegetable
production in the watershed.  We recognize that a complete ban on
vegetable production is neither feasible nor desirable. Neverthe-
less, simulating such a policy provides insights into outcomes that
would be associated with a relatively drastic policy regime.  A ban
on vegetable production affects only vegetable producers, and
tends to shift land allocation from vegetables into coffee produc-
tion. The substition of coffee for vegetables in the model reflects a
favorable relative price for coffee. Under lower coffee prices, farmsSHIVELY & ZELEK : Policy & Environment Link      111
would instead reallocate land to corn production. We also observe
a slight tendency for some former vegetable farmers to leave some
land in fallow. Under the assumption of an open labor market,
these farms sell their labor off farm. Under a less favorable off-
farm employment scenario, farms shift land into corn production.
The first column of Table 5 indicates the impact of the land
use restriction.  Farm- and area-weighted aggregate income levels
are reduced from base levels by approximately 15 percent. The
ban clearly reduces incomes for vegetable-growing farms, espe-
cially in early years where on-farm erosion has only a minor im-
pact on yields. But the ban reduces incomes only to the extent that
“next best” alternatives provide lower expected returns than veg-
etables. Accumulated sediment levels in year 10 are reduced by
approximately 37 percent from base levels. This reflects the shift
from vegetables to the less erosive forms of land use (coffee and
fallow). Nitrogen loadings fall to approximately one-third of base
levels, primarily because the nitrogen requirements of vegetables
Table 5. Summary of simulation results
-62% -39% -52% -100% Pesticides
(% change over base)
-56% -27% -50% -6 9 % Nitrogen
(% change over base)
-49% -15% -46% -3 7 % Sediment
(% change over base)
318 529 -391 0 Gov’t budget
(surplus or deficit, 
pesos/ha/yr)
-15% -12% -0 % -1 5 % HH income 
(% change over base)
20% vegetable 
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are quite high. Similarly, since vegetables are the only crops in the
model that require pesticides, the vegetable ban leads to an elimi-
nation of downstream pesticide loadings. The ban has no impact
on the government budget.
Soil Conservation with a Lump-Sum Transfer Payment
In the second simulation, we investigate the overall impact
of requiring soil conservation in the watershed.  We implement
this policy by assuming labor is required to  install and maintain
soil conservation structures on each farm, and by deducting this
labor availability (25 persondays/hectare) from the level of avail-
able household labor. At the same time, we subsidize households
for this reduction in available labor via an annual transfer pay-
ment equal to the value of the labor (at the prevailing market wage
rate). From the farm’s perspective, however, labor is typically more
valuable when used in crop production, so that the technology
imposition is not completely income neutral: the reduction in la-
bor availability influences decisions to plant labor-intensive crops,
especially vegetables, and results in an income loss for this reason.
But the presence of soil conservation has the benefit of increasing
yields for all crops, especially in later years of the planning hori-
zon, at which point yields are sensitive to the accumulated reduc-
tion in the soil stock.
The second column of Table 5 shows the impact of this policy.
The NPV of aggregate household income remains essentially un-
changed over the 10-year period compared with the base run. The
policy does induce some labor distortions: some households shift to
coffee production as vegetable production is more labor intensive
and soil conservation results in loss of labor. But for the most part,
income losses are offset by the transfer payment and the yield-main-
taining properties of soil conservation. Without the transfer pay-
ments, aggregate incomes would fall by approximately 5 percent.
Accumultated sediment is approximately 46 percent lower in this
case than the base case, nitrogen loadings decline by 50 percent,
and pesticide loadings decline by 52 percent. The NPV of publicSHIVELY & ZELEK : Policy & Environment Link      113
expenditures is approximately 391 pesos per hectare per year.  It is
important to note that these results are sensitive to assumptions
regarding yield-soil loss relationships. The overall change in crop
yields over time depends on the shape of the yield functions (with
respect to the soil stock) and the assumed rates of erosion. With
less responsive yield functions or lower rates of soil loss, the soil
conservation policy could result in lower household income due to
losses in labor availability. Furthermore, we use a relatively low
discount rate of 5 percent.  At higher discount rates, future changes
in yields and incomes would count less, and therefore, the soil con-
servation policy would be less attractive in NPV terms.
A Tax on Vegetable Producers
Results from our third policy experiment, a 20 percent tax on
vegetable producers, suggests a slight increase in the incidence of cof-
fee production and fallow in households that produce vegetables.
But in general, vegetable growers maintain their emphasis on veg-
etables and sustain a loss in income: the 20 percent tax is insufficient
to generate large changes in land use.  Overall, the NPV of income,
weighted and aggregated across all household types, falls by approxi-
mately 12 percent. The overall reduction in income is less than the
amount of the tax for two reasons. One, households that do not grow
vegetables in the base run of the model see no loss in income. And
two, among vegetable producers, some tax avoidance occurs as house-
holds shift away from vegetables. On a watershed basis, the NPV of
public revenue with the tax is approximately 529 pesos per hectare
per year. This average, however, masks some important variability in
tax revenue, which fluctuates and ranges from 1,800 pesos per hect-
are in Year 1 to 47 pesos per hectare in Year 10. The policy reduces
sedimentation by 15 percent from base levels.  Compared with the
base, nitrogen and pesticide loadings are reduced by approximately
27 and 39 percent,  respectively, due to the decrease in vegetable
production.  For vegetable-producing households, some gains in in-
come (vis-à-vis the base case) are registed in later years due to de-
creased cumulative erosion and the beneficial effect it has on yields.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 114
It is important to point out that the main mechanism by
which a tax influences an agricultural producer is by changing
the relative price the grower receives for a crop—and therefore,
the expected income from growing the crop.  However, the tax
also influences the risk-return relationship associated with the crops
in the portfolio. This second factor is important in the model be-
cause some producers are assumed to be risk averse, i.e., concerned
about income variability arising from price risk.  For this reason,
producers react to the tax with some degree of friction: they do
not fully disengage from production of the taxed crop due to a
desire to balance portfolio risks. In other words, the tax decreases
household income, but the decrease in the household objective
function (which incorporates risk considerations) is less in percent-
age terms than the tax itself.
Soil Conservation in Conjunction with a 20-Percent
Vegetable Tax
The final policy we consider combines local incentives to pro-
mote soil conservation with what we consider to be a more broadly
based (i.e. nationally determined) pricing policy for vegetables. Here
we impose the 20 percent tax on the farm gate price of vegetables
and use the revenues to provide subsidy payments for the use of
soil conservation on all farms. Consistent with the tax policy out-
lined above, we observe increases in area under coffee and fallow.
However, farms that produce vegetables have greater incomes rela-
tive to the base in some years due, in part, to the yield maintenance
afforded by soil conservation.
The NPV of total farm income in the watershed falls by ap-
proximately 15 percent under this policy. Somewhat counter to our
initial intuition, income falls by more in this case than under the tax
policy alone.  The reason for this is that the use of soil conservation
causes the household labor constraint to bind. This, combined with
the tax on vegetables, discourages their production by more than
the tax alone. Yield maintenance is insufficient to compensate. Al-
though detrimental to household incomes, this policy providesSHIVELY & ZELEK : Policy & Environment Link      115
strong environmental benefits. Nitrogen and pesticide levels decline
by 56 and 62 percent, respectively, due largely to the shift away from
vegetables. Sedimentation is likewise reduced by 49 percent.  The
government budget shows a net gain, as tax revenues more than
offset the subsidy payments.  However, the budget does not remain
constant over time and the remaining surplus is insufficient to com-
pletely offset the losses in income induced by the policy. In years
when rates of vegetable production are high, the budget is in sur-
plus. In contrast, several years show budget deficit. The government
budget ranges from 1,231 pesos per hectare to –328 pesos per hect-
are, with an average of 318 pesos per hectare per year.
LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS
Our results illustrate that local bans on crops are expensive
(to households) and less effective in curbing erosion than either soil
conservation or soil conservation in conjunction with crop-specific
taxes. Furthermore, we find that while income-neutral policies to
encourage soil conservation may be useful in reaching erosion tar-
gets, they are costly to administer. One alternative approach might
be a national-local cost-sharing plan, whereby revenues raised
through crop-specific taxes could be used to subsidize local soil con-
servation initiatives. But due to distortions induced in labor alloca-
tion decisions, combining such taxes with local mandates for on-
farm soil conservation may be tricky and could emerge as more costly
from the perspective of overall household welfare than tax policies
alone.
Several other aspects of the analysis reported above should be
noted.  First, it may be important to consider the administrative cost
of taxation, subsidies and bans.   Generally, taxes and subsidies at
the farm level are very difficult to administer.  This implies that
deficits reported in Table 5 may be larger and surpluses smaller.
Second, any nationally imposed producer tax on vegetables would
have a trade impact.  A production tax effectively shifts the domes-
tic supply of vegetables leftward, thereby raising imports.  This
may mean an increase in tariff revenue (in the presence of an im-PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 116
port tariff).  The Philippines, for example, is currently a net im-
porter of vegetables, including potatoes and tomatoes, suggesting
a positive impact on tariff revenue from a production tax.  How-
ever, a nationally imposed producer tax on vegetables (in general)
would also have significant welfare effects on all vegetable farm-
ers, including those in the lowlands (such as onion and garlic farm-
ers).  The current model does not incorporate the decisions of low-
land farmers, but these could be important in the context of na-
tionally imposed policies like producer taxes.
Finally, it is important to point out that another feasible policy
option, perhaps the most feasible at least in the context of coffee,
might be a research-cum-extension expenditure (subsidy).  For ex-
ample, yields of upland coffee can be increased through the use of
disease-resistant and high-yielding coffee varieties.  The Philippine
uplands are well suited to the production of Arabica coffee, which
has a growing local demand.  Yet virtually no extension work has
been conducted locally on Arabica coffee. (Some work has been
carried out for Robusta varieties, primarily by Nestle.)  An increase
in expenditures on coffee R&D will result, of course, in a budget
deficit.  To reduce the deficit, a coffee import tax could be com-
bined with a coffee R&D subsidy.  The country could increase tar-
iffs on coffee bean imports, which could result in a shift away from
vegetable farming in the uplands.
CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we used an optimization-simulation model to
illustrate the potential impacts of local and national policies to en-
courage sustainable land use. The model was based on a set of four
representative households occupying four distinct agroecological
zones. We assumed households in the model to choose crop shares,
defined over a portfolio of subsistence food crops, annual and pe-
rennial cash crops, to maximize a mean-variance utility function.
Using empirically derived population weights, zone-specific trans-
fer coefficients, and crop-specific erosion rates, we aggregated out-SHIVELY & ZELEK : Policy & Environment Link      117
comes across 16 household types to predict watershed-scale
changes in land use, incomes, and environmental outcomes. The
model incorporated risk considerations, labor and land constraints,
and labor market opportunities.  It provided a stylized view of
how households might respond to a range of economic policy
changes.
Restrictions on vegetable growing reduced farm and area
weighted income levels by approximately 15 percent over 10 years,
and reduced downstream loads by up to 37 percent from base lev-
els.  Soil conservation, combined with a lump sum transfer payment,
was somewhat more effective in reducing erosion and associated
agricultural externalities, but at a cost to the government of approxi-
mately 391 pesos per hectare per year. Simulation results suggest a
20 percent tax on vegetable production is insufficient to dramati-
cally alter land use patterns.  Households shift land-use somewhat
to avoid taxes, leading to modest reductions in agricultural exter-
nalities.  Combining the tax with a subsidy to soil conservation pro-
vides strong environmental benefits, but reduces household wel-
fare.  We find that, in general, economy-environment tradeoffs are
difficult to avoid. Policies that generate large environmental im-
provements (measured in terms of reduced sediment and reduced
nitrogen and pesticide flows) tend to either reduce household in-
comes in the short or long run, or place budgetary burdens on
government.  However, our analysis demonstrates the potential
value of conducting analysis of economy-environment interactions
at a “landscape” scale of analysis.  Better policy coordination be-
tween national and local policymakers, and between those respon-
sible for agricultural, trade, and environmental policies, appears
to be a necessary prerequisite for achieving least-cost environmen-
tal protection.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 118
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Appendix
Mathematical outline of the optimization-simulation model
The optimization-simulation model is constructed using Ex-
cel and STELLA. The latter is a computer simulation software pack-
age designed to model dynamic systems. The model consists of four
representative upland farms that make crop portfolio decisions un-
der uncertainty.  We use a mean-variance framework for the house-
hold model in which a farmer attempts to maximize expected util-
ity (assumed to be a weighted-sum of mean returns and expected
variance in returns), subject to a set of resource (land and labor)
constraints.  The decisionmaker is assumed to optimize his farm
plan at the start of each year, but we assume that the farmer is myo-
pic with respect to the future impacts of his current decisions.  We
define variables in the model as follows: qi is the share of land planted
with crop i, bi is the mean return for crop i, sih is the price variance
for i=h and the covariance for i¹ h, and r is the coefficient of risk
aversion. Risk sensitivity in the model is controlled via this farm-
specific risk aversion parameter.  The mean return for each crop is
computed as the market price for the respective crop pi adjusted for
the tax imposed on that crop ti, multiplied by the crop specific yield
yi, after which input costs, ci, net of any subsidies si , are deducted.
For simplicity, we assume a unit cost function for each crop and
normalize planted area on the farm to be one hectare.  Each house-
hold has a set of choice variables {qi} at each year in the simula-
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where
(1d)
To incorporate policy parameters that might possibly affect income




where gi is the variance-adjusting policy parameter for crop i.  Ex-
amples of policies that may reduce variance are those that reinforce
the marketing infrastructure for agricultural crops, for example, the
transportation system through road construction.  It is possible to
assess the impact of crop-specific policies designed to reduce in-
come variability for targeted crops. Examples of policies that could
reduce income variability for specific crops include research into
pest-resistant varieties or programs targeted at improving
postharvest handling for certain crops.  Furthermore, policies that
reduce variability of certain crops could likewise increase mean val-
ues for the respective crops.  However, this effect is not included in
this model due to data limitations.
Erosion is measured at the farm level. Erosion depends on both
physical phenomena and crop composition. We posit the farm-level
function for erosion E:
Ek,t = f(qi ,G, T, R),  (3)
where erosion on farm k at time t is a function of crop composition,
slope gradient G, soil type T and rainfall R. We expect the slope
gradient to be positively related to erosion and for the erosion rate
to increase at an increasing rate as slope steepness increases. A simi-
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lar relationship holds for rainfall: the soil’s ability to absorb rainfall
decreases as the amount of rainfall increases, thus increasing the
rate of erosion.  Erosion is measured as a flow. In each period, ero-
sion decreases the stock of soil available on the farm via the equa-
tion of motion:
(4)
In other words, the soil stock at any time t equals the soil stock at
time t-1 minus the flow of erosion in period t. As noted above, this
is a farm level outcome. Erosion also increases the stock of sediment
accumulating off-site. The stock of sediment Qt accumulates over
both time and space. Defining wk as a farm-specific erosion-sedi-
ment transfer coefficient and dj as a zone-specific sediment-deliv-
ery delay parameter, accumulation of sediment at the receptor site
is:
(5)
where t equals the number of periods in the history of the simula-
tion, m equals the number of zones, q equals the number of repre-
sentative farms within each zone, and E is defined as above.  Note
that past erosion events contribute to sediment according to a delay
specified by dj. Site-specific erosion affects sediment via a conveyor
process: the stock of sediment at time t is equal to the stock at time t-
1 plus the flow of erosion from zone j that reaches the receptor site
by t.
Viewed from the perspective of erosion and its local effect on
the soil stock, the model described thus far characterizes a simple
dynamic model with a positive feedback loop. During each plant-
ing season, the farmer chooses an optimal crop portfolio.  This gen-
erates erosion. The flow of erosion decreases the soil stock and re-
duces subsequent yields. We model this feedback explicitly by for-
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mulating crop-specific production functions of the form:
(6)
The model allows for the measurement of welfare at the level
of the household, the zone, or the watershed.  These welfare mea-
sures can be computed at a point in time, or can be expressed as the
present discounted values of the stream of incomes, summed across
households.  Using r to represent the discount rate and bk,t to rep-
resent net income at time t for household k (i.e. Gqi,tbi,t), and using
ω  and u  to represent area weights for representative households
and zones, respectively, the NPV formula for the household is:
(7)
For the zone it is:
(8)
And for the watershed it is:
(9)
A partial measure of the impact of policies on the government
budget can be calculated based on taxes and subsidies applied to
crops or inputs. The budget is partial in the sense that we can com-
pute the costs of taxes and subsidies on crops or inputs, but cannot
compute the costs of policies that might effectively stabilize mar-
kets (e.g. infrastructure improvements) or alter land tenure arrange-
ments.
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In terms of the entire watershed, the budget impact of a policy
depends on the intervention (tax or subsidy rates), the behavioral
outcomes at the farm level (e.g. crop choice), and the household or
zone-specific weights applied to representative households. The
NPV computation is:
(10)
where variables are defined as above.  Time subscripts in equation
(10) indicate that tax or subsidy rates may change over time.
() () ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
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